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Exclusion of Contingent Attorneys' Fees from
Gross Income
Stephen D. Feldmant
A plaintiff and attorney who enter into a contingent fee contract
have a unique relationship. The plaintiff has hired the attorney to
maximize his return on a potential legal claim. He could proceed pro
se, but he believes that the attorney's experience will yield a more fa-
vorable judgment despite the fact that his attorney receives, pursuant
to their contract, a portion of the judgment or settlement. In reality,
the plaintiff is never able to access the attorney's portion of the recov-
ery. Nonetheless, under current tax law, a plaintiff in certain jurisdic-
tions must pay federal income taxes on the attorney's share of the
judgment or settlement.' Because the attorney has a strong contrac-
tual right tantamount to an ownership interest in the settlement or
judgment,2 and, alternatively, because the plaintiff has no effective
means to gain dominion over the entire recovery, this Comment ar-
gues that courts should permit plaintiffs to exclude contingent attor-
neys' fees from their gross income for tax purposes.
Currently, courts disagree on whether to permit exclusion. Some
courts have disallowed exclusion because of the anticipatory assign-
ment of income doctrine. According to this doctrine, a taxpayer cannot
avoid taxation by assigning his income to another. The assignment of
income doctrine, however, evolved from a set of cases that can
t B.S.B.A. 1999, Washington University; J.D. Candidate 2002, The University of Chicago.
1 An individual can, in certain cases, exclude compensatory damages and deduct attor-
neys' fees. In many cases, however, an individual can do neither. See Part I.A.
2 See, for example, Alderman v Pan Am World Airways, 169 F3d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir 1999)
(stating that courts should rarely interfere with contingent fee contracts because it is "the freely
negotiated expression both of a [client's] willingness to pay more than a particular hourly rate to
secure effective representation, and of an attorney's willingness to take the case despite the risk
of nonpayment"), quoting Wells v Sullivan, 907 F2d 367,371 (2d Cir 1990). See Part III.A.1 for a
complete discussion.
3 See Lucas v Earl, 281 US 111, 114-15 (1930) (stating that a taxpayer cannot avoid pay-
ing income tax "by contracts however skilfully [sic] devised to prevent the salary when paid from
vesting even for a second in the man who earned it").
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be distinguished from the contingent fee arrangement, and this Com-
ment proposes that exclusion of attorneys' fees does not violate that
doctrine.
Although some courts currently permit exclusion, they rely on in-
consistent rationales. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have permitted ex-
clusion on the ground that relevant state law creates a charging attor-
ney's lien giving the attorney and the plaintiff the same power over in-
come resulting from a favorable judgment. If the plaintiff will never
see the attorney's portion of the judgment, these circuits argue, then
the plaintiff should not be taxed on it because it never belonged to
him. On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit has also permitted exclusion
when state property law does not grant the plaintiff and the attorney
the same power over judgment proceeds. Against this backdrop of un-
certainty in the Fifth Circuit and other courts, this Comment argues
that state law should not affect whether plaintiffs can exclude contin-
gent fees.
Although courts currently base their exclusion decisions on either
the assignment of income doctrine or state law, neither analysis was
designed as a method of deciding the exclusion question. The result is
that neither analysis is instructive or predictive of outcomes in exclu-
sion cases; a court might use either analysis to rule for or against ex-
clusion. In contrast, a rule requiring exclusion based on the attorney's
virtual ownership interest in the claim as created by the contingent fee
arrangement itself, not by state law, would provide consistency in
analysis and, therefore, in outcomes.
The issue of excludability is important because of the enormous
sums of money involved. The cases in which taxpayers have sought to
exclude contingent fees have involved exclusions of almost two mil-
lion dollars.4 For most individuals, two million dollars is quite signifi-
cant.'
4 See, for example, Estate of Clarks v United States, 202 F3d 854, 855 (6th Cir 2000) (stat-
ing the question in the case as whether the plaintiff must include in taxable income over $1.9 mil-
lion paid directly by the defendant to the lawyer as interest on a contingent fee).
5 Unfortunately, fee shifting cannot solve this problem. The Supreme Court has upheld
the enforcement of contingent fee contracts even when fee shifting occurred (generally, fee shift-
ing means that a court, authorized by statute, orders a losing defendant to pay the victorious
plaintiff reasonable attorneys' fees, calculated on an hourly basis). See Venegas v Mitchell, 495
US 82, 89-90 (1990) (upholding a contingent fee arrangement even though the attorney received
a higher payment under it than the payment due him under the fee-shifting statute). Thus, con-
tingent fee contracts can exist alongside statutory fee shifting, so the possibility of fee shifting
does not moot the issue of exclusion of contingent fees. Besides, even if fee shifting and contin-
gent fee arrangements were mutually exclusive, it is highly unlikely that attorneys and their cli-
ents would totally abandon contingent fee contracts and rely exclusively on statutory fee shifting.
Most lawyers probably would hesitate to take fee-shifting cases if the hourly rate was the only
form of remuneration, and moreover awarded only if successful. In addition, the majority of the
case law concerning the exclusion of contingent fees involves cases not subject to a statute that
authorizes fee shifting. See, for example, Clarks, 202 F3d at 854 (involving exclusion in a personal
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Part I of this Comment explains the tax law relevant to the exclu-
sion of contingent attorneys' fees. Part II introduces the germane case
law. Part III analyzes the tensions presented by the divergent out-
comes courts have reached and the inconsistent legal reasoning they
have used. Part III.A argues that the assignment of income doctrine
does not mandate that attorneys' fees must be included in gross in-
come. Part III.B argues that state property law should not be a factor
in deciding whether the attorney has a proprietary interest in the legal
claim such that exclusion is appropriate. Finally, Part IV proposes that
courts should allow taxpayers to exclude attorneys' fees because a
taxpayer should not be taxed on a portion of his legal claim in which
his attorney has effectively secured a proprietary interest.
I. RELEVANT TAX LAW
This section introduces two tax law concepts helpful to under-
standing why the exclusion of contingent attorneys' fees from federal
income taxation is a significant issue. Part I.A provides a brief expla-
nation of why taxpayers cannot deduct all attorneys' fees or exclude
all punitive damages from income under the Internal Revenue Code
and the consequences of the Code's deduction limitations. Part I.B
explains the assignment of income doctrine, a common law doctrine
that many courts use to preclude exclusion. The doctrine's history
shows that courts misapply it in the contingent fee scenario.
A. Limits on Deduction of Attorneys' Fees and Exclusion of
Punitive Damages
The Code limits plaintiffs' ability to deduct attorneys' fee awards
and their ability to exclude punitive damage awards. First, an individ-
ual can deduct attorneys' fees only when the fees are ordinary and
necessary trade or business expenses 6 or when they are ordinary and
necessary expenses that arose in connection with the individual's
profit-seeking activities.7 Furthermore, attorneys' fees that are de-
ductible because they arose in connection with profit-seeking activi-
ties are classified as miscellaneous itemized deductions.! A miscella-
injury claim). See also all cases cited in Part II.
6 26 USC § 162(a) (1994 & Supp 1998) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction all the or-
dinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business.").
7 26 USC § 212 (1994). The origin of the claim test determines whether the expense was
business or personal, and, hence, whether it was deductible. See United States v Gilmore, 372 US
39, 48-49 (1963) (holding that attorneys' fees are deductible as business expenses if they arise in
connection with the taxpayer's profit-seeking activities).
8 26 USC § 67(b) (1994 & Supp 1998). The Code enumerates in § 67(b) certain items that
may be fully deducted; attorneys' fees are not explicitly enumerated, and anything that is not
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neous itemized deduction is permitted only to the extent that the ag-
gregate of such deductions exceeds two percent of adjusted gross in-
come.9 Additionally, the taxpayer cannot deduct miscellaneous item-
ized deductions if he is subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax
("AMT").' ° A taxpayer must pay the AMT whenever his liability un-
der the AMT is greater than his liability under the regular tax." Con-
sider the plaintiff in Alexander v IRS"2 who could not deduct any of his
attorneys' fees: his tax liability turned a $5,000 pre-tax gain into a
$48,900 after-tax loss." These Code provisions explain why individuals
attempt to exclude, rather than deduct, attorneys' fees.
The Code limits exclusion, however. Most damage awards include
compensatory damages, meant to recompense the plaintiff for his ac-
tual loss,' and punitive damages, imposed upon the defendant for the
manner in which he inflicted the plaintiff's injuries." Under the Code,
an individual can exclude only compensatory damages -specifically,
damages that are received on account of personal injuries or sickness.'6
In contrast, the Code does not permit a taxpayer to exclude punitive
damages or interest from taxation.'7 For this reason, it is noteworthy
that compensatory damages can be significantly lower than punitive
enumerated is a miscellaneous itemized deduction. Id.
9 26 USC § 67(a) (stating that "the miscellaneous itemized deductions for any taxable
year shall be allowed only to the extent that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2 percent
of adjusted gross income").
10 26 USC § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (1994) (disallowing miscellaneous itemized deductions to tax-
payers subject to the AMT). For a discussion of the mechanics and underpinnings of the AMT,
see William D. Andrews, Basic Federal Income Taxation 779-81 (Aspen 5th ed 1999).
11 26 USC § 55(a) (1994).
12 72 F3d 938 (1st Cir 1995).
13 Id at 940. See also Laura Sager and Stephen Cohen, How the Income Tax Undermines
Civil Rights Law, 73 S Cal L Rev 1075, 1078 (2000) (using Alexander to demonstrate the drastic
tax burden that can result from AMT deduction limitations). Plaintiffs subject to these deduction
limitations often claim that the provisions are unfair. That, however, may not be the case; the
AMT represents a decision by Congress to reduce deductions and tax more income at a lower
rate. See Andrews, Basic Federal Income Taxation at 779-81 (cited in note 10).
14 Richard A. Epstein, Modern Products Liability Law 172 (Quorum 1980) (distinguishing
actual damages from punitive damages).
15 Id.
16 26 USC § 104(a)(2) (1994). Although courts have debated the definition of "personal in-
juries or sickness," that inquiry is outside the scope of this Comment. For further discussion, see
Commissioner v Schleier, 515 US 323, 336-37 (1995) (discussing two-prong test for applicability
of § 104(a)(2)). In general, courts look to the nature of the taxpayer's underlying claim to deter-
mine if the taxpayer can exclude the recovered amount. See, for example, Hukkanen-Campbell v
Commissioner, 79 Tax Ct Mem Dec (CCH) 2122,2124 (2000). The Supreme Court has noted that
the term "personal injuries," as defined in § 104(a)(2), covers nonphysical injuries in addition to
physical injuries. United States v Burke, 504 US 229, 235-36 n 6 (1992). The Court has also laid
out the requirement that a stronger causal connection than a "but-for" connection between in-
jury and damages is necessary to prove personal injury damages. O'Gilvie v United States, 519 US
79, 82-83 (1996).
17 See O'Gilvie, 519 US at 83 (holding that under § 104(a)(2) punitive damages are not
excludable from gross income).
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damages. For example, the Federal Circuit recently upheld a damage
award with a punitive to compensatory damages ratio of thirty-eight
thousand to one."' The Supreme Court has stated, "[L]ow awards of
compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio than high
compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious act has
resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.'' 9
Thus, whenever the majority of the damage award consists of pu-
nitive damages, the victorious plaintiff must include most of the re-
covery in taxable income. If the plaintiff and attorney have entered
into a contingent fee contract, part of what is nominally the plaintiff's
recovery is in reality the attorney's fees. But since the plaintiff must
include most of the nominal recovery (all punitive damages) in in-
come, the plaintiff must pay taxes on the attorney's portion of the
award, absent some other basis for nontaxation.
The Code does not distinguish between contingent fees and
hourly fees in determining deductions; the deduction permitted by
§ 162(a) is simply for "ordinary and necessary expenses paid, or in-
curred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,"20
and the deduction permitted by § 212 is for "ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year" for nonbusiness in-
come-producing activities, such as investing.2 This Comment argues
that although the Code does not distinguish between hourly and con-
tingent fees for deductions, and does not permit exclusion of either,
the unique nature of the contingent fee scenario justifies exclusion of
contingent fees. Although it might be argued that all legal fees should
be treated similarly as a matter of equity,3 hourly fees should not be
excluded because a plaintiff who hires an attorney on an hourly basis
unquestionably receives as income all proceeds from a judgment or
settlement. The contingent fee plaintiff, however, receives only a por-
tion of the proceeds pursuant to contract terms.2
18 Tronzo v Biomet, Inc, 236 F3d 1342, 1350 (Fed Cir 2001) (noting that "the constitutional-
ity of a punitive damages award is not simply a matter of numbers or ratios").
19 BMW of North America, Inc v Gore, 517 US 559, 582 (1996) (adding that a higher ratio
could also be justified when an injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of non-economic
harm is difficult to determine).
20 26 USC § 162(a).
21 26 USC § 212.
22 See Srivastava v Commissioner, 220 F3d 353,357 (5th Cir 2000) (arguing that as a matter
of "tax neutrality," contingent fees should not be excluded because hourly fees cannot be ex-
cluded).
23 See Part III.A.1.
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B. The Assignment of Income Doctrine
The Supreme Court introduced the anticipatory assignment of in-
come doctrine in Lucas v Earl.' In 1901, taxpayer Earl and his wife
entered into a contract whereby any income and property that either
spouse received during his or her lifetime became the property of
both.2 In 1920, Mr. Earl reported only half of his income with the ra-
tionale that his wife, not he, owed taxes on the other half of his income
pursuant to their contract.2' A unanimous Court decided in favor of
the IRS, reasoning that a taxpayer cannot escape paying taxes on all
"income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal
service"2'7 through anticipatory assignments of income, no matter how
"skilfully [sic] devised.""
While Earl addressed the assignment of income from wages,
Corliss v Bowers and Helvering v Clifforde dealt with the assignment
of income from property. The taxpayer in Corliss, who retained the
power to revoke a trust, violated the assignment of income doctrine
by assigning trust income to a beneficiary and then not including the
trust income in his gross income.3" The taxpayer in Clifford, who held a
reversionary interest in a trust, also violated the doctrine by assigning
income from the trust and excluding the trust income from his taxable
gross income.32 According to the Supreme Court: "[T]axation is not so
much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual com-
mand over the property taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax is
paid."33
The Court expressed the rigidity of the assignment of income
doctrine in Helvering v Horst, " in which the taxpayer, Horst, assigned
detachable coupon bonds to his son. Horst lost complete control of
24 281 US 111 (1930).
25 Idat 113-14.
26 Idatll3.
27 Id at 114, quoting Revenue Act of 1918 § 213(a), Pub L No 254, 40 Stat 1057, 1065
(1919).
28 281 US at 115.
29 281 US 376 (1930).
30 309 US 331 (1940).
31 281 US at 377-78 (holding that a taxpayer who assigned income to a trust with the
power to modify the terms of the trust violated the assignment of income doctrine by excluding
income assigned to trust from gross income).
32 309 US at 335-38 (noting that because the taxpayer husband retained control over the
income assigned to the family trust, the taxpayer could not exclude the assigned income). The
holdings of Corliss and Clifford have been codified in the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 USC
§§ 673,676 (1994).
33 Corliss, 281 US at 378.
34 311 US 112 (1940).
35 Id at 114. The owner of a coupon bond has the right to receive interim interest payment
on the bond in the amounts and dates specified by the coupons. See id at 115. The owner of a de-
tachable coupon bond can literally detach the coupon and sell it independently. See Steven A.
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each coupon bond once he made each transfer." Nonetheless, Horst
could not exclude the coupon bond income.37 The Court explained its
ruling as a mandate of the unbending rule of Earl: when the assignor
receives a benefit, he cannot escape taxation by assigning this income
to another.3
These cases demonstrate two points important to contingent fee
taxation. First, according to Corliss and Clifford, control over property
results in taxation; a plaintiff with a contingent fee contract, however,
has no control of the property taxed. 9 Second, under Horst, the receipt
of certain benefits results in taxation; a plaintiff with a contingent fee
contract, however, has received no "benefit" in the same sense as in
Horst.
II. EXCLUSION, THE ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME DOCTRINE, AND
ATTORNEY'S LIENS
This Part examines the two theories courts apply in contingent
fee exclusion cases: the assignment of income doctrine and state law.
A. The Assignment of Income Approach
In Baylin v United States," the Federal Circuit held that a tax-
payer could not exclude contingent fees because the contingent fee
contract violated the assignment of income doctrine." The Federal
Circuit found that the plaintiff's legal claim had value before the hir-
ing of an attorney and that the plaintiff assigned some of that value to
the attorney in exchange for the attorney's services.3 According to the
court, the fact that the plaintiff and attorney "chose to estimate" the
value of the fee in the form of a fixed percentage of a contingent re-
covery did not make the claim valueless at the time when the plaintiff
hired the attorney:
That the partnership assigned a portion of its condemnation re-
covery to its attorney before it knew the exact amount of the re-
covery does not mean that this amount never belonged to the
partnership; it means simply that the attorney and client chose to
Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive Compensation, 7 DePaul Bus L
J 301,315 (1995).
36 Horst, 311 US at 114-15.
37 Idat 119-20.
38 Id at 115-17 (explaining that the taxpayer's personal receipt of income is not the only
way to measure realization).
39 See Part III.A.1.
40 See id.
41 43 F3d 1451 (Fed Cir 1995).
42 See Part I.B for an overview of the assignment of income doctrine.
43 Baylin, 43 F3d at 1454-55.
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estimate the value of the attorney's services by tying the fee to
the ultimate recovery and by having the obligation of the client
to the attorney discharged by having the state pay the attorney
his fees directly from the recovery.
Thus, the Federal Circuit deviated from the Fifth Circuit, which
reasoned in Cotnam v Commissioner'5 that the plaintiff "could never
have collected anything or have enjoyed any economic benefit unless
she had employed attorneys" to do so. The contrast between Baylin
and Cotnam demonstrates that a court's view of the value of a legal
claim shapes whether or not it believes the assignment of income doc-
trine applies to contingent fee contracts."
The Federal Circuit is not alone in denying exclusion on the basis
of the assignment of income doctrine. The United States Tax Court has
refused to permit exclusion of contingent attorneys' fees in all cases
except those that may be appealed to the Fifth Circuit or Eleventh
Circuit.4 Most recently, in Kenseth v Commissioner, the Tax Court re-
affirmed its general position against exclusion." Unlike the Fifth Cir-
cuit, the Tax Court emphasized the control a plaintiff maintains over
his claim: the plaintiff can agree to a settlement or even discharge his
attorney, thereby canceling the assignment to that attorney.51 The court
rejected the argument that the claim was speculative and valueless
without the aid of an attorney:52 "Attorney's fees, contingent or other-
wise, are merely a cost of litigation in pursuing a client's personal
rights.... The entire ADEA award was 'earned' by and owed to peti-
tioner, and his attorney merely provided a service and assisted in
realizing the value already inherent in the cause of action." 3 In dissent,
one judge argued that the assignment of income doctrine is judge-
44 Id at 1455.
45 263 F2d 119 (5th Cir 1959). A full discussion of the holding and reasoning of Comam can
be found in Part 1I.B.1.
46 Id at 126.
47 In Part III.A, this Comment argues that an attorney increases the value of the legal
claim. An individual cannot assign the proceeds from the increased value to the attorney because
the proceeds would not exist if not for the attorney's efforts.
48 The "Golsen rule" requires the Tax Court to follow "a Court of Appeals decision which
is squarely in point where appeal from our decision lies to that Court of Appeals and to that
court alone." Golsen v Commissioner, 54 Tax Ct 742,757 (1970), affd 445 F2d 985 (10th Cir 1971).
See also Davis v Commissioner, 76 Tax Ct Mer Dec (CCH) 46,48 (1998), affd as Barlow-Davis v
Commissioner, 210 F3d 1346 (11th Cir 2000) (permitting exclusion pursuant to Golsen rule be-
cause case was appealable to Eleventh Circuit which has followed the Cotnam reasoning).
49 114 Tax Ct 399 (2000), affd, 2001 US App LEXIS 17445 (7th Cir).
50 114 Tax Ct at 412.
51 Id at 414-16.
52 For this argument, see Estate of Clarks v United States, 202 F3d 854, 857 (6th Cir 2000)
(stating that "the value of taxpayer's lawsuit was entirely speculative and dependent on the ser-
vices of counsel").
53 Kenseth, 114 Tax Ct at 413.
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made law and that courts can "interpret, refine, and distinguish" to de-
cide whether the conditions for application of the doctrine exist)
The Seventh Circuit also joined the Federal Circuit recently by
affirming the Tax Court's Kenseth decision.55 According to the Seventh
Circuit, the taxpayer violated Lucas v Earl by assigning a portion of
his income, which is different from assigning a contract or an income-
generating asset. Although the court recognized that "contingent
compensation constitutes the recipient a kind of joint venturer of the
payor," 7 the court concluded that contingent fees are a litigation ex-
pense that a taxpayer may deduct (where permissible) but may not
exclude. 8
B. The State Law Approach
Some courts use state law to examine the exclusion question.
State law itself is quite varied and the interpretations and applications
can differ dramatically depending upon the text of the individual stat-
ute or the common law tradition. A few major state law interpreta-
tions, however, help guide most federal court analysis.
1. Cotnam: The statutory attorney's lien.
In Cotnam, Ethel Cotnam reported as gross income only the
segment of her $120,000 judgment that she kept after subtracting her
contingent attorneys' fees.9 The Fifth Circuit permitted exclusion on
the basis of an Alabama statute that created a charging attorney's
lien.)° A charging attorney's lien gives an attorney the right to a por-
tion of any money or property obtained in litigation through the at-
torney's efforts." A lien is a security interest; it is not an ownership
stake.6
At the time, the Alabama statute stated:
Upon suits, judgments, and decrees for money, [attorneys] shall
have a lien superior to all liens but tax liens, and no person shall
be at liberty to satisfy said suit, judgment or decree, until the lien
or claim of the attorney for his fees is fully satisfied; and attor-
54 Id at 427 (Beghe dissenting).
55 Kenseth, 2001 US App LEXIS 17445 at *1.
56 Id at *6-7.
57 Id at *5.
58 Id at *10.
59 263 F2d at 121.
60 Id at 125.
61 Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 558 (West 1986).
62 Benci-Woodward v Commissioner, 219 F3d 941, 943 (9th Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US
1112 (2001) (stating that "an attorney lien does not confer any ownership interest upon attor-
neys" and is merely a security interest in the litigation proceeds).
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neys at law shall have the same right and power over said suits,
judgments and decrees, to enforce their liens, as their clients had
or may have for the amount due thereon to them.63
The key part of the statute comes after the semicolon: in order to
enforce the lien, the attorney possesses the "same right and power
over" the suits and judgments as his client. This enforcement right
converted the attorney's security interest into an ownership interest.
The court concluded that the portion of the judgment upon which the
attorney had his enforceable lien should be excluded from the plain-
tiffs gross income.6 In sum, the rule from Cotnam equates to the fol-
lowing: when a statute gives an attorney equal rights to proceeds from
a judgment or settlement, exclusion is appropriate.
Other courts, however, have used state property law as the basis
for denying an exclusion. For example, in Coady v Commissioner,6 the
Ninth Circuit held that the Alaska Code does not give an attorney an
61
ownership interest in a plaintiff's cause of action. Unlike the Ala-
bama statute, the Alaska statute does not grant an attorney any rights
or powers over the income generated by a lawsuit. 6 The entire judg-
ment was therefore income to the plaintiff, so the court denied the
taxpayer's exclusion.6
Missouri's attorney's lien statute has also been distinguished from
Alabama's statute. Missouri's statute reads:
63 Cotnam, 263 F2d at 125 n 5, quoting 46 Ala Code § 64(2) (1940). The current Alabama
attorney's lien statute employs almost exactly the same language. See Ala Code § 34-3-61 (1975).
64 46 Ala Code § 64(2).
65 Cotnam, 263 F2d at 125.
66 213 F3d 1187 (9th Cir 2000), cert denied, 2001 US LEXIS 2936.
67 Id at 1190.
68 Alaska Stat § 34.35.430 (Michie 2000). The statute states:
(a) An attorney has a lien for compensation, whether specially agreed upon or implied, as
provided in this section
(1) first, upon the papers of the client that have come into the possession of the attorney
in the course of the professional employment;
(2) second, upon money in the possession of the attorney belonging to the client;
(3) third, upon money in the possession of the adverse party in an action or proceeding
in which the attorney is employed, from the giving of notice of the lien to that party;
(4) fourth, upon a judgment to the extent of the costs included in the judgment or, if
there is a special agreement, to the extent of the compensation specially agreed on, from
the giving of notice of the lien to the party against whom the judgment is given and filing
the original with the clerk where the judgment is entered and docketed.
(b) This lien is, however, subordinate to the rights existing between the parties to the action
or proceeding.
Id.
69 213 F3d at 1191.
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The compensation of an attorney or counselor for his services is
governed by agreement, express or implied, which is not re-
strained by law. From the commencement of an action or the ser-
vice of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who
appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or
counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or
judgment in his client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whose-
soever hands they may come; and cannot be affected by any set-
tlement between the parties before or after judgment."
According to the Tax Court, this statute stands in "marked con-
trast" to the Alabama statute because the Missouri statute "does not
give attorneys the same right and power over suits, judgments, and de-
crees as their clients had or may have."7'
The Federal Circuit also rejected the argument that Maryland law
created a lien similar to that held by the attorney in CotnamY Mary-
land law recognized a charging attorney's lien, but it did not afford an
attorney rights equal to his client's in the proceeds from a judgment or
settlement: "Like any other lien, this lien does not create an ownership
interest in the attorney, but merely places a charge upon the fund as
security for the debt which is owed to the attorney by his client."73
Courts' interpretations of the statutes in Alaska, Missouri, and
Maryland demonstrate that some courts take the language of the Ala-
bama statute to be the only language that permits exclusion. Part III
questions whether this interpretation of Cotnam is correct in light of
the realities and the unique nature of the contingent fee scenario.
2. Clarks: The common law attorney's lien.
In Estate of Clarks v United States,4 the plaintiff excluded from
his gross income the portion of his contingent attorneys' fees that he
could not deduct as compensatory damages. The court relied on an
attorney's lien created by Michigan law; however, unlike the statutory
attorney's lien in Cotnam, Michigan's attorney's lien arose from com-
mon law." The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan common law lien
70 Mo Ann Stat § 484.130 (West 1987).
71 Hukkanen-Campbell v Commissioner, 79 Tax Ct Mem. Dec (CCH) 2122,2126 (2000).
72 See Baylin, 43 F3d at 1454-55. A Maryland statute gives an attorney a lien on "attorney's
fees and compensation specifically agreed on." Md Bus Occ & Prof Code Ann § 10-501 (1989).
73 Baylin, 43 F3d at 1455, citing Chanticleer Skyline Room, Inc v Greer, 271 Md 693, 319
A2d 802,806 (1974) (emphasis added by the Federal Circuit).
74 202 F3d 854 (6th Cir 2000).
75 Id at 855. For a discussion of the attorneys' fees that an individual can deduct under the
Tax Code, see Part I.A.
76 202 F3d at 856.
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operated in the same manner as the Alabama statutory lien." The lan-
guage of the Michigan common law case on which the Sixth Circuit
relied, however, did not resemble the Alabama statute from Cotnam.
Rather, the principle of the Michigan lien, as described by Michigan
case law, is as follows: "[T]he agreement amounts to an assignment of
a portion of the judgment sought to be recovered or expected as the
fruit of the litigation.""' The Michigan common law lien diverges from
Cotnam's statutory language; in no Michigan common law case does a
court state that attorneys have the same right and power over suits,
judgments and decrees as have their clients. In fact, the Michigan case
law could be interpreted to mean that the contingent fee contract is an
assignment of the judgment, which would violate the assignment of in-
come doctrine and lead to a denial of the exclusion of the fees. 9
The Sixth Circuit further explained its decision to permit exclu-
sion on the basis that the attorney entered into a joint venture with
the taxpayer." They sought together to win a common pool of monies,
and they contracted ex ante to decide how the pool would be divided."
The Sixth Circuit followed the Cotnam reasoning and distinguished
the attorney from the wife in Earl and from the son in Horst; the at-
torney provided a valuable service in order to earn his share of the in-
come rather than simply receiving it as a gift.
This Comment argues that this distinction is especially important
because, without the attorney's efforts, the attorney would receive
nothing. In Earl, Corliss, and Clifford, on the other hand, the income
each donee received might have fluctuated or been speculative at
some point, but any uncertainty regarding the income to be assigned
in those cases was due to factors unrelated to the donee.
3. Srivastava: State law appears irrelevant.
In Srivastava v Commissioner,"' the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its
holding in Cotnam in favor of exclusion despite reservations about
Cotnam's reasoning and key differences in the state statute."
Srivastava questioned several of Cotnam's premises. The court found
no reason to believe that Congress either intended to subsidize only
contingent fee agreements, or that the plaintiff did not gain from the
77 Id.
78 Dreiband v Candler, 166 Mich 49,131 NW 129, 129 (1911).
79 See Part IV.B.
80 Clarks, 202 F3d at 857.
81 See id ("Like an interest in a partnership agreement or joint venture, Clarks contracted
for services and assigned his lawyer a one-third interest in the venture in order that he might
have a chance to recover the remaining two-thirds.").
82 220 F3d 353 (5th Cir 2000).
83 Id at 357-64.
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portion paid to the attorney, or that the contingent fee structure allo-
cated control over the claim completely to either the plaintiff or the
attorney. ' Furthermore, the Texas law applicable in Srivastava did not
track the language of the Alabama statute, which was the foundation
for exclusion in Cotnam. The Fifth Circuit described the Texas com-
mon law attorney's lien as follows: "[T]he lawyer's rights, based on the
contingent fee contract, are wholly derivative from those of his client.
The attorney-client relationship is one of principal and agent. There-
fore, the rights of each in a cause of action during the existence of that
relationship are necessarily ... interwoven with the other."'
Because of the principal-agent relationship, an attorney in Texas
could not have the equivalent protection that the Alabama statute
confers-the same rights and powers as his client over the proceeds
from a judgment. The Fifth Circuit, however, disregarded the lien be-
cause the court believed that the lien addressed the relationship be-
tween the defendant, who will actually pay the proceeds, and the at-
torney.86 The court stated that the relevant relationship to answer the
exclusion question is that of the plaintiff vis-A-vis his attorney."' Fol-
lowing this rationale, the Fifth Circuit demoted the charging attorney's
lien from its lofty status as the impetus for exclusion to the level of to-
tal insignificance. This latest holding and reasoning leaves courts
without a structured approach to the exclusion question. The next part
of the Comment attempts to create some of this much-needed struc-
ture.
84 Id.
85 Id at 368 (Dennis concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks
omitted), quoting Dow Chemical Co v Benton, 163 Tex 477,357 SW2d 565,567 (1962).
86 Srivastava, 220 F3d at 363-64.
87 Id.
88 In the end, however, the court held that it must follow Cotnam because Srivastava was
"substantially indistinguishable." Id at 357. As a procedural matter, Cotnam can only be over-
ruled if the Fifth or Eleventh Circuit sits en banc. See Kenseth, 114 Tax Ct at 412 n 6.
The Fifth Circuit is the only circuit that has had the opportunity to decide this issue based on
divergent state laws on attorney's liens, yet the circuit did not let state law dictate the outcome.
Srivastava, 220 F3d at 357-58. The court's arguments against Cotnam demonstrate that the court
could have denied exclusion by staying true to the reasoning of Cotnam: state law is determina-
tive.
Another court-the Tax Court-also appears to take the stance that state law plays no role
in the exclusion question. Unlike the Fifth Circuit, however, which has held for exclusion, the Tax
Court holds against exclusion. In O'Brien v Commissioner, the Tax Court said that even an "ir-
revocable assignment of a portion" of a future recovery would violate the assignment of income
doctrine. 38 Tax Ct 707, 712 (1962), affd, 319 F2d 532 (3d Cir 1963). The Tax Court found that the
Internal Revenue Code was not intended to turn on such "refinements" as the existence of an at-
torney's lien. Id. This statement harkens back to the Supreme Court's statement in Corliss that
taxation is not concerned with "refinements of title" but rather with "actual command over the
property taxed." 281 US at 378. So even if state law mandated an irrevocable assignment of an
attorney's portion of a judgment, the Tax Court would disallow exclusion.
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III. FINDING THE HEART OF THE CONTINGENT FEE RELATIONSHIP
There are two problems with the approaches courts have taken in
addressing whether contingent attorneys' fees should be excluded
from gross income. First, the taxpayer-client lacks control over the
proceeds to which his attorney is entitled, and control is required for
the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine to apply. Second, al-
though courts often turn to state law to define federally taxable prop-
erty interests, state lien laws were not written with the exclusion of
contingent fees in mind. Consequently, they provide little assistance to
courts.
A. Control and the Inapplicability of the Assignment of
Income Doctrine
The essence of the assignment of income doctrine is control. 8 Be-
ginning with Earl and continuing through Clifford and Horst, the Su-
preme Court clarified that the assignor's control of income determines
whether he can escape taxation by assigning this income to another
taxpayer.] In Earl, the husband created the income; his wife received
nothing from the contract unless he earned income." In Clifford, the
taxpayer owned a reversion in the trust from which the income was
paid."' In Horst, the taxpayer retained the principal of the bond while
distributing the bond's coupons.93 Control is the litmus test for taxation
because the taxpayer derives a benefit from control.
The most important determination, therefore, is whether the tax-
payer-client relinquished control of part of his claim by entering into a
contingent fee contract. This Comment proposes that he never con-
trolled the attorney's portion of the judgment or settlement. The as-
signment of income doctrine, therefore, should not apply, and he
should be able to exclude the attorneys' fees.
1. The legal claim has no value until the moment of judgment
or settlement.
Some courts view the taxpayer-client as a principal who controls
the legal claim and the attorney as his agent who derives a right to in-
come from his claim. In this model, the attorney has no ownership
stake in the claim. Any exclusion of attorneys' fees would therefore
89 For a discussion of the evolution of the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine, see
Part I.B.
90 Earl, 281 US at 114-15; Horst, 311 US at 114.
91 281 US at 113-14.
92 309 US at 332-33.
93 311 Us at 114-15.
94 See, for example, Michigan Mutual Insurance Co v Smoot, 129 F Supp 2d 912, 923 (E D
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violate the assignment of income doctrine. Compare, for example, the
contingent fee arrangement to the assignments in Horst and Clifford.9
Because the taxpayer in Horst retained the principal of his bond and
derived a benefit from presenting the coupon bond as a gift to his son,
he violated the assignment of income doctrine.* In the contingent fee
case, the client retains the majority of the legal claim while assigning a
small portion of the claim to his attorney, a situation very similar to
the coupon bond Horst assigned to his son. In Clifford, the assignment
of income from the taxpayer's trust to his family violated the doctrine
because the taxpayer's reversionary interest in the trust gave him re-
sidual control.n Similarly, in the contingent fee setting, the client has
what could be considered a reversion on his legal claim: he can re-
move the claim from the attorney at any time, and he retains the final
decision regarding settlement."
The contingent fee arrangement, however, is more complex. First,
a plaintiff has a significantly better chance of maximizing proceeds
from a legal claim if he hires an attorney. One empirical study found
that consumers of legal work are more likely to hire attorneys as the
consumers' legal claims increase in factual or legal complexity 9 An-
other study found that advocates with advocacy experience and sub-
stantive experience are likely to be the most successful advocates."
Commentators without empirical evidence have reached the same
conclusion that self-represented litigants are disadvantaged compared
to attorneys. When a self-represented litigant must advocate against
an attorney, the self-represented litigant is substantively disadvan-
taged ' and is susceptible to unethical behavior."° Furthermore, the
Va 2000) (referring explicitly to attorney and client as principal and agent respectively). See also
Kenseth, 114 Tax Ct at 413 ("Attorneys represent the interests of clients in a fiduciary capacity. It
is difficult, in theory or fact, to convert that relationship into a joint venture or partnership.").
95 See Part I.B for a discussion of Horst and Clifford.
96 311 US at 119-20.
97 309 US at 335.
98 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (ABA 2000) ("A lawyer shall
abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter."). See also Ken-
seth, 114 Tax Ct at 414-16 (explaining that Cotnan did not address the fact that a tort plaintiff
has continuing control with respect to settlement of his legal claim and has the power to dis-
charge his attorney). But see F.B. MacKinnon, Contingent Fees for Legal Services: A Study of
Professional Economics and Responsibilities 196 (Aldine 1964) (explaining that as a practical
matter attorneys have control of settlement and strategy in contingent fee cases).
99 Steven R. Cox and Mark Dwyer, A Report on Self-Help Law: Its Many Perspectives 21,
24 (ABA 1987).
100 Herbert M. Kritzer, Working Paper, First Thing We Do, Let's Replace All the Lawyers: A
Comparison of Lawyers and Nonlawyers as Advocates 5 (Wisconsin 1995). In a study of tax ap-
peal hearings, attorneys won 36 percent of their cases, while non-attorneys won only 15 percent
of their cases. Id at 6-7.
101 See Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of
Failure to Settle, 49 Case W Res L Rev 315, 340 n 131 (1999) (collecting citations to commenta-
tors' assertions that "where only one side is represented, pro se litigants are substantively disad-
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Supreme Court has recognized that litigants are better served by hir-
ing counsel than proceeding pro se: "[T]he successful prosecution of
meritorious claims is better served by a rule that creates an incentive
to retain counsel."' 3
The following example shows how an attorney adding value to a
legal claim makes the contingent fee scenario different from Earl and
its progeny. Consider a plaintiff who wishes to pursue a legal claim. If
he chooses self-representation, he will receive settlement proceeds of
$100,000.' 4 If he hires an attorney, however, he will receive twice that
amount in settlement proceeds, or $200,000. When the plaintiff actu-
ally hires the attorney under a 30 percent contingent fee agreement,
the most the plaintiff can possibly assign is $100,000- the maximum
value of his claim. The plaintiff, however, will receive $140,000 from
the settlement because he has hired the attorney; the attorney takes
$60,000 pursuant to the contingent fee agreement. The $140,000 that
the plaintiff receives is more than the value of the plaintiff's claim be-
fore he hired the attorney. The plaintiff, therefore, did not assign the
$60,000 to the attorney because the plaintiff never had the $60,000.
Without the attorney the $60,000 never would have arisen as proceeds.
The plaintiff simply agreed that the attorney would have an interest in
any proceeds that might result from the attorney's pursuance of the
legal claim.
What we see is that the control element that was so crucial in
Earl and Horst does not exist in the contingent fee situation. Earl as-
signed his salary to his wife. Even if his salary fluctuated annually, his
salary did not depend on whether he assigned it to his wife. Earl was
going to get a salary regardless. Horst assigned interest coupons to his
sons. Even if the interest payments were based on a changing interest
rate, the interest payments did not depend on whether he assigned the
coupons to his sons. Horst would get the interest regardless.
vantaged").
102 Russell Engler, Out of Sign and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers' Nego-
tiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 Cal L Rev 79, 82 (1997) (noting that the ethical
rules designed to protect the unrepresented in their dealings with attorneys "routinely go un-
heeded").
103 Kay v Erhler, 499 US 432,438 (1991) (disallowing a pro se litigant to receive attorneys'
fees because it would "create a disincentive to employ counsel whenever [a pro se litigant] con-
sidered himself competent to litigate on his own behalf").
104 A body of literature argues that a market of unmatured tort claims could function,
thereby suggesting that a bare claim has value in itself. See Richard A. Epstein, Torts 905-07
(Little, Brown 6th ed 1995) (describing the argument that tort victims could receive immediate
and certain compensation by selling claims in a market). But see Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in
Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J Legal Stud 329,339-40 (1987) (explaining that a market in tort
claims could be inhibited if the tort victim lacks incentive to testify accurately and to the best of
his ability).
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The fact that a client can fire an attorney during representation
does not change the conclusion that there is no assignment of income.
It is true that an attorney fired before a judgment could bring a suit in
quantum meruit. But that fact does not weaken the argument that the
moment of judgment or settlement is the critical point for deciding the
exclusion question for contingent fees. Until a judgment or settlement
is reached, there is no income that can be subject to federal income
tax. But when a judgment or settlement occurs, the attorney gains a
contractual right to a portion of the proceeds that did not exist before
that point. The attorney's right to those proceeds is strong because
courts should give "due deference to the intent of the parties";.. the
agreement is the "freely negotiated expression"'' of the willingness of
the client and his attorney to enter into such a contract. It is true that
courts can review contingent fee contracts to ensure reasonableness"
and, moreover, that contingent fee agreements should not be treated
as ordinary commercial contracts. '8 The baseline, however, is that
courts are reluctant to disturb contingent fee agreements because, as
the Supreme Court wrote, a "request for attorney's fees should not re-
sult in a second major litigation."''
Moreover, the contingent fee contract is one in which the attor-
ney's right to his portion of a settlement or judgment is lost only when
a court finds his fee was unreasonable.' ° Once the plaintiff has
reached a settlement or judgment, the contingent fee contract will be
enforced."' Given this right, a plaintiff should not be taxed on his at-
torney's portion of the judgment or settlement. As the Supreme Court
105 Wells v Sullivan, 907 F2d 367,371-72 (2d Cir 1990) (stating that there is no per se test for
reasonableness of contingent fee agreements and that courts should give the same deference to
contingent fee agreements as they would to any contract embodying the intent of the parties).
106 Id at 371. See also Alderman v Pan Am World Airways, 169 F3d 99,102-03 (2d Cir 1999)
(explaining that "[clourts should be reluctant to disturb contingent fee arrangements freely en-
tered into by knowledgeable and competent parties"). See also note 2.
107 McKenzie Construction, Inc v Maynard, 758 F2d 97, 100-01 (3d Cir 1985). Courts can
also invalidate fraudulent contingent fee agreements. See In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate
Blood Products Litigation, 159 F3d 1016,1020 (7th Cir 1998) (affirming district court's injunction
and declaratory relief against lawyers' enforcement of certain contingent fee contracts).
108 McKenzie Construction, 758 F2d at 101.
109 Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 US 424,437 (1983) (discussing the nature of the contingent fee
agreement in the context of a fee dispute).
110 Northern Heel Corp v Compo Industries, Inc, 851 F2d 456, 475 (1st Cir 1998) ("If law-
ful -and, generally speaking, contingent fees have not been thought unlawful for well over two
decades-the contingent fee should be enforced unless it is unreasonable under the circum-
stances.") (internal citations omitted).
11l Horrigan v Thompson, 2000 US App LEXIS 22292, *22-23 (6th Cir) (stating that attor-
neys discharged after settlement should receive their share of a settlement pursuant to their con-
tingent fee agreement with the client, and that the attorneys' recovery was not limited to quan-
tum meruit when they had substantially performed the required legal work, but affirming the
district court's denial of their motion to intervene on the grounds that their pursuit of the claim
in a parallel state court action was adequate).
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made clear in Corliss, "[T]axation is not so much concerned with the
refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property
taxed."'2
2. An attorney provides a service to access his portion of a
judgment or settlement.
Those who argue for the principal-agent relationship ' 13 point out
that the attorney's income most often comes from recoveries related
to services provided by the plaintiff."' In Cotnam, for example, the
plaintiff sought a portion of the estate of a gentleman for whom the
plaintiff acted as a caretaker."' Such cases compare very favorably to
Earl, in which Mr. Earl violated the assignment of income doctrine by
assigning wages that he earned or would earn in the future."' If courts
view contingent attorneys' fees as income from the plaintiff's wages
that he sought to recover in a lawsuit, the fees should be treated as an
anticipatory assignment of income.17
This model fails, however, because not all contingent fee cases
concern recovery of earned wages. For example, Clarks concerned a
claim for personal injury damages." More importantly, the contingent
fee scenario is distinguishable because the attorney must provide a
service to access his share of a judgment or settlement. The donees
from the cases establishing the assignment of income doctrine were
involved in intrafamily gift situations."9 This is significant not because
the donees offered no consideration for their income received, but
rather because their actions had nothing to do with whether their in-
come existed in the first place. Even if each donee exchanged some-
thing of value for the income he received, the assignors in these cases
would have violated the assignment of income doctrine by excluding
the assigned income. This is because the assignors controlled the in-
come, even if the income was speculative. In the contingent fee setting,
112 281 US at 378. See also text accompanying notes 29-33.
113 For the original discussion of the principal-agent idea, see Part III.A.1.
114 See Deborah A. Geier, Some Meandering Thoughts on Plaintiffs and Their Attorneys'
Fees and Costs, 87 Tax Notes 531, 538-39 (2000) (discussing the difficulty in differentiating ser-
vices income and property income).
115 263 F2d at. 120-21. See also text accompanying notes 59-60; Coady, 213 F3d at 1187 (dis-
cussing plaintiff who sought back pay after an allegedly discriminatory termination).
116 281 US at 114-15. See also text accompanying notes 24-28.
117 In his dissent in Cotnam, Judge Wisdom explained that the plaintiff earned through her
services the entirety of the judgment she hoped to recover. Therefore, she had control over that
income, and her assignment of it to her attorneys should not allow her to evade taxation. 263 F2d
at 126-27.
118 202 F3d at 855. See also Srivastava, 220 F3d at 355-56 (evaluating the exclusion resulting
from a legal suit involving a libel claim).
119 In Corliss and Clifford, each taxpayer hoped to dodge income taxation by hiding his in-
come as a gift to a family member. See Part I.B.
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the attorney-not the plaintiff-has earned his portion of the settle-
ment, and the plaintiff should be able to exclude that portion.'2"
3. Ethical rules recognize an attorney's interest.
An additional argument is that the American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognize an attorney's owner-
ship interest in a contingent fee case. Model Rule 1.8(j) states that at-
torneys cannot acquire a proprietary interest in a cause of action ex-
cept through a lawyer's lien or in contingent fee cases.'2' It is true that
the ethics rules mandate careful use of contingent fee arrangements.'n
In particular, the ABA's Comment to Model Rule 1.5 also states that
an attorney cannot enter a fee agreement that might induce him to
perform his services in a way contrary to his client's interest."' These
restrictions, however, do not take away from the fact that an attorney
has an ownership interest in a contingent fee case. Moreover, the rele-
vant point of analysis for tax purposes is the moment when a legal
claim has been converted into a favorable judgment or settlement 'N -
at that time, any decision by the client to discharge his attorney"' can-
not divest the attorney of his share of the total recovery as set by the
terms of a valid contingent fee contract.
B. The Role of Attorney's Liens Created by State Law
Rather than recognize an attorney's interest in a judgment or
settlement as defined by his contingent fee agreement, many courts
use attorney's liens as proxies for an attorney's right to legal fees. A
charging lien affords an attorney the right to a portion of the money
or other property obtained in litigation through the attorney's
efforts. Many states create a charging lien by statute,"' but the lien
exists in other states as a function of common law."8 The lien covers
120 The attorney-client relationship in a contingent fee scenario can even be viewed as a
partnership under the Uniform Partnership Act of 1997 § 101(6), 6 ULA 35 (West Supp 2000)
(defining a partnership "as an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit"). See Letters to the Editor, 88 Tax Notes 1059, 1059 (2000) (letter of Robert
W. Wood, arguing that a contingent fee probably satisfies the definition of a partnership under
the UPA). See also MacKinnon, Contingent Fees for Legal Services at 196 (cited in note 98) (stat-
ing that attorneys have more practical control over contingent fee cases than non-contingent fee
cases).
121 Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.80).
122 See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-7 (ABA 1982) ("[A] lawyer...
should enter into a contingent fee arrangement only in those instances where the arrangement
will be beneficial to the client.").
123 Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5 cmt 3.
124 See Part III.A.1.
125 See Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) (stating that the client has the final deci-
sion in all matters involving his attorney).
126 See Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics at 558 (cited in note 61).
127 See, for example, Ala Code § 34-3-61.
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other states as a function of common law.ln The lien covers the judg-
ment that the lawyer acquired for his client. 129 The lien is a security in-
terest; it is less than a proprietary interest. ' The client owns the en-
tirety of the underlying judgment, and the attorney has a claim, like a
creditor, against a portion of the judgment.
At first, relying on state property law to resolve the exclusion
question seems sensible. Although the Internal Revenue Code should
be interpreted to apply uniformly across states,"' courts determining
federal tax law often look to state law to define property interests and,
hence, what is taxable: "[I]n the application of a federal revenue act,
state law controls in determining the nature of the legal interest which
the taxpayer had in the property.''32 Given, however, that an attorney
has a powerful right created by contract to a portion of the judgment
or settlement,"' the use of state law attorney's liens is unnecessary.
The state law approach should also be abandoned because state
laws are not instructive or predictive of outcomes; that is, if a court is
to rely on a state law in determining the attorney's interest in judg-
ment or settlement proceeds in a contingent fee case, the state law
should be relatively clear. The problem is that state lien laws were not
created with the exclusion question in mind and are ambiguous with
regard to the issue. Two courts could arguably interpret the same stat-
ute in completely different ways. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit in
Srivastava hesitated to permit an intracircuit split on the application
of federal tax law when the two states' lien laws were clearly distin-
guishable.' 4
1. State law provides no guidance.
The Fifth Circuit in Cotnam rested its holding on an Alabama
statute that stated, "[A]ttorneys at law shall have the same right and
128 See, for example, Clarks, 202 F3d at 856 (referring to the Michigan attorney's lien as a
"common law lien").
129 See People v Keeffe, 50 NY2d 149,405 NE2d 1012, 1015 (1980).
130 Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics at 558 (cited in note 61). Part III.A argued that the at-
torney's interest in a contingent fee arrangement is more like a proprietary interest than a lien. If
that proposition is correct, then the nature of the attorney's lien should not affect the exclusion
question.
131 Burnet v Harmel, 287 US 103,110 (1932) ("[T]he will of Congress ... is to be interpreted
so as to give a uniform application to a nationwide scheme of taxation.").
132 Morgan v Commissioner, 309 US 78,82 (1940). See, for example, Poe v Seaborn, 282 US
101, 110 (1930) (using Washington law to determine property interest of taxpayer); Greer v
United States, 207 F3d 322,327 (6th Cir 2000) (examining Kentucky law to determine nature of
tort claim in determining whether damages are excludable); Green v Commissioner, 855 F2d 289,
292 (6th Cir 1988) ("Although the property interests of divorcing parties are determined by state
law, federal law governs the federal income tax treatment of that property.").
133 See Part III.A.1.
134 220 F3d at 363-65 & n 33.
1328 [68:1309
Exclusion of Contingent Fees
power over said suits, judgments and decrees, to enforce their liens, as
their clients had or may have for the amount due thereon to them.'. 5
This clause, the court determined, recognized that attorneys have an
ownership interest in a legal claim. The argument that attorneys have
an ownership interest in a contingent fee scenario is a powerful one.'3
However, the argument that this particular statutory language pro-
vides conclusive evidence of an attorney's ownership interest is ques-
tionable. An explicit grant of a proprietary interest in the legal claim
to the attorney might be a more direct and unambiguous method of
establishing an ownership interest.
Cotnam's reliance on that particular statutory language trans-
formed the phrase "the same right and power over said suits, judg-
ments and decrees" into magic words that confine courts' interpreta-
tions of lien statutes. Fdr example, consider Maryland's lien statute,
which states that an attorney has a lien on both "an action or proceed-
ing of a client""13 and "a judgment or award that a client receives.... It
would be sensible to think that in order for an attorney to exercise
these rights, the statute must grant the attorney rights equal to those
of his client.
The same logic can be applied in the interpretation of Missouri's
lien statute.' In Hukkanen-Campbell v Commissioner,' theTax Court
distinguished the Missouri statute from the Alabama statute on which
Cotnam relied: "Although both provisions give an attorney a lien to
secure his or her compensation, the Missouri provision . . . does not
give attorneys the same right and power over suits, judgments, and de-
crees as their clients had or may have.' '.. The statute recognizes that
an attorney's compensation for services is "governed by agreement,
express or implied."'." If this is interpreted as a recognition of the at-
torney's strong contractual interest in the proceeds, ' then it would not
be unreasonable to interpret the entire statute as giving, in a contin-
gent fee scenario, an attorney an interest tantamount to ownership.
Another example is Nebraska's attorney's lien statute, which
reads, "An attorney has a lien for a general balance of compensa-
tion ... upon money ... in the hands of the adverse party in an action
or proceeding in which the attorney was employed."'' The statute spe-
135 263 F2d at 125 n 5, citing 46 Ala Code § 64(2).
136 See Part III.A.1.
137 Md Bus Occ & Prof Code Ann § 10-501(a)(1) (2000).
138 Id § 10-501(a)(2).
139 See text accompanying note 70.
140 79 Tax Ct Mem Dec (CCH) 2122 (2000).
141 Id at 2126.
142 Md Bus Occ & Prof Code Ann § 10-501(a)(1).
143 See text accompanying notes 105-12.
144 See Petersen v Commissioner, 38 Tax Ct 137, 152 (1962).
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cifically points out money in the hands of the adverse party, thereby
indicating that it is at least plausible that the plaintiff is never going to
get that money-that is, in a dispute, the attorney will get it first. But,
the statute does not contain the Cotnam magic words.
Consider also the Alaska lien statute that the Ninth Circuit inter-
preted in Coady.'' The Alaska statute states that an attorney has a lien
"upon money in the possession of the adverse party in an action or
proceeding in which the attorney is employed."" An interpretation of
this phrase alone might presume that a charging attorney's lien im-
plies or even necessitates that the attorney will have an equivalent
power over his client's judgment to enforce his lien. The last line of
the statute, however, states: "This lien is, however, subordinate to the
rights existing between the parties to the action or proceeding.""7 This
is certainly a clear statement that a litigant has priority vis-A-vis his at-
torney to a portion of proceeds from a judgment or settlement. How-
ever, if the attorney has a contractual interest tantamount to a pro-
prietary interest, as Part III.A argues, then the final line of the Alaska
statute does not apply to the proceeds due to the attorney pursuant to
the contingent fee agreement. The plaintiff has a superior right vis-A-
vis his attorney for the 60 percent of the judgment due to the plaintiff,
but the attorney has a superior right vis-A-vis his client for the attor-
ney's 40 percent. This interpretation is obviously a matter of opinion,
but holding a court to the Cotnam magic words makes such an inter-
pretation-a plausible interpretation-impossible to reach.
The situation becomes more confusing because not all attorney's
liens are based on statutes. ' Consider Wisconsin law, which recognizes
a common law charging attorney's lien that appears "broadly to be a
remedy to prevent unjust enrichment to a client whose attorney has
performed well and secured a judgment.' 4 On its face, this common
law lien arguably should give an attorney the same rights to a portion
of the judgment as his unjustly enriched client.
The common law liens of some other states are also open to in-
terpretation. For example, the Ninth Circuit characterized the Califor-
nia common law attorney's lien as follows:
[A]n attorney ... acquires no more than a professional interest.
To hold that a contingent fee contract or any 'assignment' or
'lien' created thereby gives the attorney the beneficial rights of a
real party in interest, with the concomitant personal responsibil-
145 213 F3d at 1190. See text accompanying notes 66-68 for a discussion of Coady.
146 Alaska Stat § 34.35.430(a)(3).
147 Id.
148 See Part II.B.2.
149 Matter of Richland Building Systems Inc, 40 BR 156, 158 (Bankr W D Wis 1984).
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ity of financing the litigation, would be to demean his profes-
sion."O
This statement is ambiguous in light of the fact that the ethical
rules of the legal profession, the ABA's Model Rules, explicitly recog-
nize that attorneys have ownership interests in contingent fee con-
tracts.' A "professional interest," using the terminology of the Ninth
Circuit, could certainly be considered to be an ownership interest even
if the Ninth Circuit feels it would demean the legal profession.
Consider also Pennsylvania's common law attorney's lien. The
Tax Court held that the Pennsylvania common law lien does not cre-
ate an ownership interest for an attorney.'52 The only case the Tax
Court cited to support this holding, however, was an 1852 case.'53 The
Tax Court's ruling came over one hundred years later, in 1968. The Tax
Court said that an attorney in Pennsylvania keeps "only those pro-
ceeds of the judgment which come within his possession in an amount
equal to reasonable compensation for his services.""' That statement
could fit within the framework of an attorney having an ownership in-
terest in the proceeds of a settlement or judgment. 5 An ownership in-
terest in settlement or judgment proceeds becomes more likely when
one considers that the Pennsylvania lien operates such that "[a] court
will endeavor to protect attorneys who claim fees from a fund created
largely, if not entirely, by their efforts.'516 If the lien is truly about pro-
tecting attorneys who receive proceeds only when they generate them
through their efforts, an ownership interest is a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the lien.
The point here is not so much that one interpretation is correct
and another is incorrect. The point is that these liens are completely
ambiguous and can be interpreted either for or against taxpayers.
Attorney's lien laws vary in certain respects from state to state.
The states may differ in how they treat attorney's rights to the judg-
ments vis-A-vis other creditors."' States also disagree over whether an
attorney's lien takes precedence over a set-off judgment. "8 These dif-
150 Benci-Woodward v Commissioner, 219 F3d 941,943 (9th Cir 2000), quoting Isrin v Supe-
rior Court, 63 Cal 2d 153,403 P2d 728,732-3 (1965).
151 See Part III.A.3.
152 Estate of Gadlow v Commissioner, 50 Tax Ct 975,980 (1968).
153 Id, citing Balsbaugh v Frazer, 19 Pa 95,99 (1852).
154 Estate of Gadlow, 50 Tax Ct at 980.
155 Id.
156 Turtle Creek Bank & Trust Co v Murdock, 157 Pa Super 528,43 A2d 554,556 (1945).
157 Compare Local 58, IBEW v G. T Einstein Electric, Inc, 932 F Supp 974,979 (E D Mich
1996) (holding that a Michigan charging lien was subject to other liens perfected prior in time),
with Brooks v Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc, 137 Ga App 176,223 SE2d 225,227 (1976) (find-
ing that a statutory attorney's lien in Georgia wis superior to all other liens except tax liens).
158 A set-off judgment entitles a debtor to reduce the amount of a debt by any sum that a
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ferences, however, are with respect to other third parties, and they
provide no guidance in regards to an attorney's proprietary interest in
a legal claim and his relationship vis-A-vis his client. If there is legisla-
tive history covering attorney's liens, courts do not cite it; courts and
commentators do, however, agree that the attorney's lien was "in-
vented by the courts for the protection of attorneys against the knav-
ery of their clients, by disabling clients from receiving the fruits of re-
coveries without paying for the valuable services by which the recov-
eries were obtained."'5 9 Given this background, courts should interpret
attorney's lien statutes and common law attorney's liens in the man-
ner that best protects attorneys. If liens are to protect attorneys
against their clients, the default rule should be equal rights for attor-
neys and clients.
2. The case law demonstrates that state law is neither instructive
nor predictive of outcomes.
Because state law is unclear on the nature of the attorney's stake
in a legal claim, a court can reach any conclusion it wishes by its inter-
pretation of state law. First, consider again Clarks. The Sixth Circuit
permitted exclusion based on this excerpt from a Michigan court opin-
ion: "the [contingent fee] agreement amounts to an assignment of a
portion of the judgment sought to be recovered.'.'. Not only does this
language fail to mirror the statutory language in Cotnam, but also it
could reasonably be interpreted to mean that the contingent fee con-
tract is an assignment of the judgment, which would violate the as-
signment of income doctrine. A plausible view of the Clarks holding is
that the Sixth Circuit felt that exclusion should be permitted, as evi-
denced by its enthusiastic endorsement of the "joint venture" ap-
proach,"' so it liberally interpreted state law to reach that end.
State law also provides little guidance in the Ninth Circuit's rul-
ing in Coady. The Alaska statute provides that an attorney has a lien
creditor owes the debtor. Compare Ramsey v Sumner, 211 Ga App 202, 438 SE2d 676,678 (1993)
(finding an attorney's lien arising under a Georgia statute superior to a set-off judgment) with
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Levy, 77 F2d 972, 975 (5th Cir 1935) (stating that in Ala-
bama, as between a set-off judgment and an attorney's lien, the first claim filed was superior).
159 Clarks, 202 F3d at 856, citing Ray Andrews Brown, The Law of Personal Property § 116
at 559 (Callaghan 2d ed 1955). See also Robert L. Rossi, 2 Attorneys' Fees 247 (Law Coop 1995)
(stating that attorney's liens are based on the equitable concept that an attorney should be paid
from the proceeds he obtained).
160 202 F3d at 854.
161 Id at 856 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Dreiband v Candler, 166 Mich 49,
131 NW 129, 129 (1911).
162 202 F3d at 857-58 (stating that the lawyer has become a "tenant in common" with his
client, and the income should be charged to the lawyer because the lawyer is the one who earned
it and received it).
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"upon money in the possession of the adverse party in an action or
proceeding in which the attorney is employed."' A court could con-
strue this provision to give an attorney the same right as his client to
the adverse party's assets, which would make the provision similar to
the Cotnam statute and permit exclusion. The Ninth Circuit disal-
lowed exclusion, however, pointing to a different part of the statute
that seems to deal with retaining liens rather than charging liens.' The
court also referenced an Alaskan case to support the proposition that
Alaska law "does not confer any ownership interest upon attorneys or
grant attorneys any right and power over the suits, judgments, or de-
crees of their clients.' 6' The referenced case, however, states only that
clients retain primary control of settlement of legal claims. '6 There is
nothing in the case indicating that a lawyer has no ownership interest
in the claim, especially at the moment when a settlement or judgment
has been legally entered.
Finally, consider Srivastava, in which the Fifth Circuit had the per-
fect opportunity to uphold the importance of state law in the exemp-
tion question, following the reasoning of Cotnam.1V Even though the
.applicable Texas law did not clearly give attorneys the same rights
over judgments as their clients, the court nonetheless permitted exclu-
sion, claiming it must follow the holding in Cotnam.'6 The reasoning in
Cotnam, however, was that state law determined the attorney's owner-
ship interest. If courts permit exclusion even when state law does not
give an attorney an ownership interest like that in Cotnarn, state law
appears to play no role in the exclusion determination. One plausible
reading, therefore, is that the Fifth Circuit essentially chose to have a
consistent rule (exclusion in all cases) that may be problematic rather
than a rule (following state law) that generates inconsistent outcomes.
The price of state-to-state variation proved to be too much.
The Fifth Circuit might very well hesitate to create an intracircuit
split on federal income tax application in this particular situation. Al-
though intracircuit splits based on divergent state laws are not un-
common, the attorney's liens created by state law, as Part 1II.B argues,
do not speak to the issue of exclusion of contingent fees. Because of
the lack of clarity of these state laws, the court might find it anoma-
lous for a plaintiff to be permitted to exclude millions of dollars in one
163 Alaska Stat § 34.35.430.
164 Coady, 213 F3d at 1190. Contingent fee contracts give rise to charging liens, not retaining
liens. See text accompanying notes 126-30.
165 Coady, 213 F3d at 1190, citing Hagans, Brown & Gibbs v First National Bank ofAnchor-
age, 783 P2d 1164, 1168 (Alaska 1989).
166 Id at 1168.
167 220 F3d at 363-65.
168 See Part II.B.3.
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state, such as Alabama, but be restricted from excluding in another
state in the same circuit, such as Texas.
3. Reliance on state law might necessitate exclusion of all
legal fees.
Statutes like Alabama's, under which the attorney has the same
rights and powers over a judgment as has his client, arguably call for
exclusion of any judgment for all plaintiffs whether they hired their at-
torneys on an hourly fee or on a contingent fee. It makes sense, how-
ever, that contingent fees should be excluded but hourly fees should
not. A client who hires an attorney by paying hourly fees receives all
proceeds from a judgment or settlement; the client is willing to com-
mit to pay legal fees by the hour and receive all proceeds. On the
other hand, as this Comment has argued, the contingent fee attorney
creates the proceeds he receives from a settlement or judgment, so the
tax system should not treat the contingent fee client as having re-
ceived the attorney's proceeds as the client's income.
One might argue that if a plaintiff is taxed upon an entire judg-
ment if he pays an hourly fee, but a plaintiff is not taxed upon an en-
tire judgment if he agrees to a contingent fee, then a rational plaintiff
would never use hourly fees. There are three responses: First, the at-
torney paid hourly may provide better representation because she
does not have to worry about investing time for zero payoff."' Second,
the attorney who can charge by the hour may be a better attorney
than the attorney who has yet to prove herself and must enter contin-
gent fee agreements to attract clients."° Third, this concern may not
occur frequently because attorneys who charge hourly fees may only
serve clients who can pay the fees prior to judgment or settlement. If
an attorney knows that her fees depend on reaching a judgment or
settlement, and she can receive a larger premium through contingent
fees, then she will try to use contingent fees rather than hourly fees.'
169 One concern with contingent fees is that attorneys may charge an excessive fee in rela-
tion to the effort they provide. See Robert L. Rossi, 1 Attorneys' Fees 97-98 (Law Coop 2d ed
1995).
170 This is merely a conjecture that some attorneys prefer hourly fee contracts because of
the certainty of payment, and most of the attorneys who can attract clients to pay hourly fees are
those who have succeeded in previous cases and therefore have a good reputation.
171 There is an additional policy argument that contingent fee clients are often individuals
who lack the funds to pay hourly fees. In each case, such individuals must calculate whether it is
better (1) to pay a premium and hire on a contingent fee and not get taxed, or (2) to pay hourly
and not pay a premium and get taxed. (There is a risk premium that the contingent fee lawyer
charges.) Large, institutional clients will have the ability to make this calculation. Individuals in-
jured in personal injury situations will be less able to make this calculation, and these individuals
will be forced to choose the contingent-fee attorney. The policy argument is that such individuals
should be able to exclude contingent fees because they cannot perform the calculus.
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In addition, a sophisticated plaintiff who could not deduct attor-
neys' fees pursuant to § 212(1) of the Code could hire an attorney in a
state with a charging attorney's lien like that in Alabama, not pay his
attorney until he wins a judgment, and then exclude his income. '
Hopefully, courts would recognize this behavior as obvious tax eva-
sion, but that should not be counted on. More importantly, the mere
possibility of this behavior confirms the lack of guidance that state law
provides in the exclusion analysis. Courts, therefore, should not rely on
such an ambiguous theory of analysis to determine the rights of attor-
neys in contingent fee situations. 3
C. State of Confusion: No Reconciliation of State Law and the
Assignment of Income Doctrine
The case law demonstrates that courts have yet to explain the re-
lationship of the attorney's lien vis-A-vis the assignment of income
doctrine; that is, it is unclear which is the threshold analysis. The Fifth
Circuit had an opportunity to offer guidance in Srivastava because
Texas law does not create as strong an attorney's lien as did the Ala-
bama law in Cotnam.'74 Had it allowed exclusion solely on the basis of
the joint venture argument, the Fifth Circuit would have established
that the question of control of the legal claim was the threshold analy-
sis. The Fifth Circuit, however, wrote explicitly that it was required to
follow Cotnam despite the Texas-Alabama distinction.' Yet, the court
also indicated that it might disallow exclusion if the issue had been
one of first impression."' The question, unfortunately, remains unan-
swered as to whether the court would disallow exclusion because the
plaintiff-taxpayer violated the assignment of income doctrine or be-
cause the language of the Texas statute does not establish a strong at-
torney's lien.
The Fifth Circuit's cloudy opinion in Srivastava may nonetheless
have conveyed an important message. Perhaps the court permitted ex-
clusion because it could not tolerate the arbitrary results of exclusion
in Alabama and non-exclusion in Texas, especially with potentially
large sums of federal income tax at stake. This sets up a workable solu-
172 It is true that the legal system tolerates some forum shopping; consider the forum shop-
ping that occurred prior to Erie v Tompkins. See Erie, 304 US 64,73-74 (1938), discussing Black
& White Taxicab Co v Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co, 276 US 518 (1928).
173 One last consideration is the theoretical concern that, if state law controls the exclusion
question, plaintiffs will shop for states in which to contract with attorneys. The recent surge of
case law concerning exclusion of contingent fees clearly demonstrates that some plaintiffs are
keen enough to understand the ramifications of excluding fees.
174 Srivastava, 220 F3d at 357-58; Cotnam, 263 F2d at 125.
175 Srivastava, 220 F3d at 357-58.
176 Id at 357 ("Were we ruling on a tabula rasa, we might be inclined to include contingent
fees in gross income.").
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tion: permit exclusion in all cases regardless of the state's attorney lien
laws.
IV. EXCLUSION SHOULD BE PERMITTED
To resolve the circuit split and create a uniform doctrine, courts
should permit exclusion of contingent attorneys' fees from a plaintiff's
gross income in all cases. First, the anticipatory assignment of income
doctrine 77 is court-made law that should recognize the realities that(a) a client cannot assign judgment or settlement proceeds that would
not exist without the attorney and that the client will never receive as
income; and (b) the contingent fee contract gives the attorney a stake
in a judgment or settlement. " " Second, this solution disregards state
property law, the application of which generates inconsistent results.7 9
Third, permitting exclusion by recognizing the attorney's ownership
interest eliminates the balancing act that courts face involving the as-
signment of income doctrine and attorney's liens created by state
law."" Finally, this solution aids taxpayers such as the taxpayer in Alex-
ander who saw a $5,000 pre-tax gain become a $48,500 after-tax loss
because he could neither exclude nor deduct his attorneys' fees.'8'
A. A Plaintiff Should Not Be Taxed on His Attorney's Interest
Although a legal claim originates from a taxpayer-client, the
claim has little value without the services of an attorney. In theory, a
legal claim has value before an individual hires an attorney. Most
plaintiffs, however, must hire attorneys to maximize their return on a
legal claim. Even if the attorney takes 40 percent of judgment or set-
tlement proceeds pursuant to a contingent fee contract, the 60 percent
of the proceeds that the plaintiff receives is greater than the entire
proceeds the plaintiff would have received had he chosen self-
representation. The plaintiff could not have assigned the 40 percent
of the proceeds to his attorney because the 40 percent did not exist
when the plaintiff hired the attorney. The 40 percent exists only in
theory only after the plaintiff hires the attorney, and it becomes reality
only at the moment of judgment or settlement.
This nature of the contingent fee arrangement can be distin-
guished from the cases instituting the assignment of income doctrine,
177 See Part I.B.
178 See Part 1II.A.
179 See Part II.B.
180 See Part III.C.
181 72 F3d at 940. See text accompanying notes 12-13.
182 See text accompanying notes 99-103 (discussing why an individual has a better chance
of maximizing proceeds from a settlement or judgment when he hires an attorney).
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in which the value of the income fluctuated irrespective of the assign-
ment. With the contingent fee arrangement, the expected value of
judgment or settlement proceeds increases when an attorney is hired.
It is only because of the attorney's efforts that he receives his pro-
ceeds. In Earl and Horst, the donees performed no service that af-
fected the value of their income received.1" Once the moment of
judgment or settlement has arrived, a contingent fee attorney gains a
strong contractual right to a portion of the proceeds subject only to
certain reasonableness determinations.'M In essence, the attorney has
accepted a proprietary interest in the lawsuit, which he is permitted to
do under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(j).'8 ' Since the as-
signment of income doctrine is court-made law, courts should utilize
its malleability to correct the apparent inconsistencies among contin-
gent fee taxation cases.1
B. Consistency
This Comment's proposed solution eliminates reliance on the
state law of attorney's liens and thereby eliminates the arguably in-
consistent results offered by the current case law. Courts have no
guidance in interpreting state law concerning attorney's liens; if legis-
lative history exists, the courts have so far failed to cite it. The Ala-
bama statute in Cotnam giving attorneys equal rights with their clients
over judgments was enough for the Fifth Circuit to permit exclusion.
3
In Srivastava, however, the court permitted exclusion even though the
applicable Texas law did not function like Alabama's. 6 To date, no
standard has emerged for how courts should interpret state law deal-
ing with attorney's liens. This situation is further compounded by the
existence of liens derived from common law and statute. In many
183 This is not an argument that the contingent tee scenario is distinguishable from Earl and
Horst because the contingent fee attorney provides services in exchange for a portion of judg-
ment or settlement proceeds. The argument is that the plaintiff does not assign the proceeds re-
ceived by the attorney because the attorney creates the income himself. If a plaintiff contracted
with some other party (but not his attorney) to give 10 percent of the proceeds he received from
a judgment or settlement in exchange for something of value, and the plaintiff excluded that 10
percent from his taxable gross income, that would violate the assignment of income doctrine; it
would be an assignment of speculative income, but the actual existence of the income does not
depend on the party with whom the plaintiff contracted. It would be the same as Mr. Earl assign-
ing his speculative work wages to his wife or a person assigning stock of a company to another
person.
184 For a discussion of courts' adherence to contingent fee contracts subject to reasonable-
ness determinations, see text accompanying notes 105-12.
185 See Part III.A.3.
186 See Kenseth, 114 Tax Ct at 419 (Chabot dissenting) (stating that courts have a right and
an obligation to correct errors made in evolution of assignment of income doctrine).
187 263 F2d at 125.
188 See Part II.B.3.
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cases, state laws, such as the Alabama statute, can even be construed
to permit exclusion of all legal fees. Nevertheless, courts continue to
turn to state law to answer the contingent fee exclusion question.
Srivastava shows that circuit courts will be reluctant to permit differ-
ing applications of federal income tax law based on arcane and highly
ambiguous interpretations of state law."89
The proposed solution also removes the balancing act that courts
have not resolved involving the role of attorney's liens and the as-
signment of income doctrine. So long as courts feel compelled to ex-
amine state laws concerning attorney's liens, their analyses probably
cannot be reconciled. Courts will continue to issue opinions such as
Srivastava' " and Clarks,"' in which the courts reach their desired end -
permitting exclusion-but brush over the laws regarding attorney's
liens without explaining the laws' significance for the holding.'9 Per-
mitting exclusion by recognizing the ownership stake an attorney has
in a contingent fee case would create a single, cogent doctrine.
C. Permitting Exclusion Is an Equitable Result
Although this Comment's solution is not based on fairness, it
does address outcomes that may be perceived as inequitable.93 Indi-
viduals should not be discouraged from initiating meritorious lawsuits
because of taxation of attorneys' fees.'94 Regardless of fee-shifting pro-
visions,'9' the lawsuits most likely to be discouraged are those involving
civil rights and employment discrimination." Intuition says that tax
law should not stifle the advancement of civil rights and equity in the
workplace. It is true that Congress could add deductions to handle
these situations, but courts can correct the problem more rapidly
through exclusion.
189 If one were convinced that state law must determine property rights for purposes of the
exclusion question, the confusion created by the case law should at least lead to a rule of inter-
pretation that absent a clear, unequivocal statement otherwise, attorneys' fees should be ex-
cluded.
190 220 F3d at 353.
191 202 F3d at 854.
192 It should be noted that the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Clarks may have been driven by the
court's preference for the "joint venture" rationale, while the Fifth Circuit decision in Srivastava
was less favorable toward exclusion but was likely driven by a desire to avoid an intracircuit split
based on highly ambiguous distinctions in state law.
193 See, for example, Alexander, 72 F3d at 940 (transforming plaintiffs $5,000 pre-tax gain
into a $48,900 after-tax loss because of deduction limitations).
194 One counterargument is the following: if one accepts that attorneys will charge a higher
percentage because they are no longer taxed on that percentage, exclusion will bring about a
transfer from the government to attorneys rather than to plaintiffs.
195 See note 5 for a discussion of Venegas and fee shifting.
196 See Sager and Cohen, 73 S Cal L Rev at 1100 (cited in note 13).
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D. Contingent Fee Arrangements Should Not Be Discouraged
The greatest criticism of this solution might be that it encourages
contingent fee agreements. One major concern with contingent fees is
that experienced attorneys can use their superior knowledge of the
costs and risks of litigation to set a bloated percentage fee that does
not correlate to the actual time and risk employed by the lawyer.", In
addition, when an attorney is not paid by the hour, he might be
quicker to convince his client to cease litigation prematurely. '9
The contingent fee contract, however, exists because of several
benefits that outweigh any negatives. The possibility of a contingent
fee arrangement could help convince a risk-averse person with a meri-
torious claim to file a lawsuit. In addition, contingent fees shift more
risk to the attorney, who provides services for which he does not know
if he will be compensated. An attorney might work harder or give his
best effort if his compensation depends on that particular effort."' Fi-
nally, if concerns remain regarding the potential for bloated contin-
gent fees, courts' imposition of reasonableness on fees'o' and the
Model Rules' prohibition on unreasonable fees 20' ease these worries at
least in part.
CONCLUSION
The contingent fee arrangement is unique. An individual can only
increase the value of his legal claim by entering into an agreement giv-
ing his attorney the right to a share of any judgment or settlement
proceeds-proceeds that would not exist without the attorney's effort.
If there is no judgment or settlement, the attorney gets nothing. As the
ABA's Model Rules recognize,2n the attorney owns a portion of the
claim; the client and his attorney are partners in a joint venture. Be-
cause of this relationship, the client should not include the attorney's
share of a judgment or settlement as part of the client's gross income.
The client has hired the attorney to access the value of the client's
197 See Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics at 529 (cited in note 61).
198 Id. See also Murray L. Schwartz and Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the
Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 Stan L Rev 1125,1126-27 (1970) (explaining that
attorneys' interests and clients' interests may not necessarily be aligned in contingent fee ar-
rangements).
199 See Rossi, 1 Attorneys' Fees at 96 (cited in note 169) ("[P]roponents of the contingent
fee arrangement contend that it permits an attorney to devote his full time and attention to a
case."). But see Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a
Market on Champerty?, 71 Chi Kent L Rev 625, 670-74 (1995) (explaining how contingent fee
arrangements may cause attorneys to pursue litigation and settlement strategies that do not
maximize client welfare).
200 See text accompanying notes 105-12.
201 See Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5.
202 See text accompanying notes 121-25.
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share of the legal claim. The attorney necessarily has his own share of
the legal claim because the attorney is a requisite part of the lawsuit.
Although some courts view the contingent fee arrangement as a viola-
tion of the assignment of income doctrine, the doctrine should not ap-
ply because the client never assigned income. The client should not in-
clude the attorney's share in his gross income.
